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Challenges for Research on Resource-Rich Economies 
GUY MICHAELS* 
Abstract 
The scope for economic research on resource-rich countries has widened 
considerably over the past two decades. While examination of market-based 
channels mechanisms (such as spending effects and exchange-rate appreciation) 
and resource price volatility are still important, other issues are coming to the 
forefront. These include the risk of depletion or technological changes that may 
reduce demand for natural resources or production factors, issues related to 
migration and inequality, and concerns regarding the use or misuse of revenues 
from natural resources and power struggles over them. Concerns about the 
effects of resource-abundance also extend beyond national borders, covering 
such diverse topics as conflicts over the control of resources and their possible 
contribution to climate change. I argue that progress in understanding these 
issues is constrained by the shortcomings of cross-country analysis as a way to 
model counterfactual scenarios and by the paucity of good data. The paper 
outlines specific gaps in the literature, pointing the way for future research on 
resource-rich economies in general and on the Gulf states in particular. 
Keywords 
development; Gulf states; natural resources  
JEL Codes: O13, Q30, N50 
1. INTRODUCTION 
People have been using nature’s bountiful resources since the dawn of time. But 
despite considerable research on natural resources, their impact on economic 
development is still the subject of much debate among economists. Rather than 
summarize the vast literature on this subject, this paper takes a broad view of the 
issues and proposes directions for future research on resource-rich economies,  
with an emphasis on the oil-rich Gulf states. 
While oil may be an especially important natural resource, the range of natural 
resources used by people is, of course, very broad. For the purposes of this article we 
can consider three types of resource. First, we may look at hydrocarbons (especially 
oil and natural gas) and other minerals which are widely considered ‘non-renewable’. 
Non-renewable resources accumulated very slowly throughout the Earth’s history and 
the only way to increase useable reserves is to discover new deposits or to develop 
better techniques for extraction. Second, we may consider other natural resources such 
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as freshwater sources and fisheries. These may sometimes replenish themselves 
within decades or centuries, rather than eons. However, given humanity’s growth and 
increased demand (which is especially strong in the Middle East), even historically 
abundant fisheries can no longer be treated as renewable for practical purposes. Third, 
we could examine natural attractions such as scenic mountains or coastlines. These 
are not harvested in the sense of being moved from their natural location. 
Nevertheless, these resources are also used intensively for agriculture, tourism and 
residential or commercial construction. Such intensive use sometimes alters them and 
inflicts on them environmental damage. While most of the discussion in this paper 
applies to the first type of natural resources, and especially oil, some of the issues that 
arise are also relevant to the other two types of resource. 
Having defined the types of natural resource on which to focus, we can now 
ask ourselves, which economies are rich in natural resources? While most Gulf states 
intuitively appear to fit the bill well, finding a good empirical definition of resource 
abundance is not as easy as it may seem. First, technology and demand affect the price 
of natural resources, changing the relative resource-abundance of different locations 
over time. Second, it is difficult to assess the physical quantity of economically 
extractable resources in many countries. Moreover, quantities currently extracted (and 
existing reserves) are endogenous to prices, technology, and political considerations. 
Measuring initial endowments, while conceptually better, is often difficult in practice. 
Third, even if we could measure the price and quantity of natural resources, it is not 
clear whether we want to normalize our measure of resource abundance by gross 
domestic product (GDP) or by population. 
With these caveats in mind I try to characterize countries where natural 
resource extraction plays an important economic role. These include, along with oil-
rich Middle Eastern countries, some African countries and some developed countries. 
But if measuring resource-richness is not straightforward, assessing its causal impact 
turns out to be even harder. Problems of endogenous extraction (today and in the 
past), spurious correlation with confounding variables and poor comparability of 
outcomes across countries have made it difficult to reach a consensus regarding the 
causal effect of natural resources on these economies. Along with efforts to overcome 
these challenges in the cross-country setting, this paper argues that analysis of case 
studies of natural resource discovery and of resource-rich areas within countries 




Having examined the attempts to assess the overall impact of natural resources 
in this section, I then examine specific economic channels through which natural 
resources can affect development (section 2). The third section of the paper begins by 
outlining the challenges that economies face in mapping their resource endowments 
and developing a resource extraction industry. I then examine some of the effects that 
a mature resource extraction industry may have on the economy. These effects include 
various forms of ‘Dutch disease’, generated by spending of resource income or by 
increased demand of certain sectors for production factors. Other economic effects 
might arise from a high volatility of natural resource prices. These effects might imply 
that non-oil sectors might be at a disadvantage in resource-rich economies, as might 
be the case in the Gulf states.  
The accumulation of suitable production factors, such as physical capital, 
labour, and education is also a challenge for resource-rich economies, and it often 
involves absorbing considerable migration. If this is done well, resource-rich 
economies may benefit from the agglomeration of production factors, but integrating 
immigrants is not an easy task. Lastly, economies that have developed a sizeable 
resource extraction sector face risks of resource depletion, declines in demand and 
technological change that reduces demand for certain skills. Adjustments to such 
shocks often take time and they can be costly and painful. 
The fourth section of this paper examines the roles of government in resource-
rich economies, and the rules and strategies for procuring natural resource revenues 
and spending them. This section also examine various political economy channels, 
through which abundant natural resources might increase rent-seeking, patronage and 
waste, or shortened planning horizons due to increased political challenges to power. 
Finally, I briefly explore issues related to lobbying, colonial legacies, international 
relations and the political economy of migration. I conclude that despite considerable 
research effort, the importance of many of these mechanisms has not been 
convincingly identified, even in settings with good data. The paucity of good  
data on oil-rich economies, and especially on the Gulf states, further restricts  
our understanding of the issues particular to this region. 
2. ASSESSING THE OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF RESOURCE ABUNDANCE 
This section begins by attempting to characterize the world’s resource-rich 




overall economic performance and potential concerns regarding the interpretation  
of these estimates. Finally, I discuss how evidence from case studies of different 
countries and from variation within countries can further inform our understanding. 
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper examines the challenges faced by 
economies rich in natural resources, especially non-renewable resources, such as 
hydrocarbons and minerals. Given this focus, we can now ask, which economies are 
rich in natural resources? You might think that all we need to do to answer this 
question is to measure the endowment of each resource and to value it at market 
prices. But, as we shall see, measuring quantities is not straightforward. And 
fluctuations in prices imply that economies that are currently considered resource-rich 
were not necessarily considered resource-rich in the past (think about the Arabian 
Peninsula before the discovery of oil) and may not remain so in the future. 
In order to measure the economic importance of natural resources in different 
economies today, I first obtain population and GDP in historical dollars and 
purchasing power parities (PPP) for 2001 using the Penn World Table (PWT) data 
(Heston et al. 2006).1 I then use data from United Nation (UN) Statistics Division 
(2009) to calculate the share of mining in each country’s GDP in 2001.2 These data 
allow us to calculate mining GDP and total GDP (and values per capita) for most 
countries, using 2001 data wherever possible. Of the 188 countries in the PWT 
dataset, I matched the mining share of GDP for 170 countries which were home to 
over 98 per cent of the total PWT-covered population and contributed more than 98 
per cent of the PWT-covered GDP in 2001. Over all the countries examined, mining 
accounted for about 2.4 per cent of total GDP, but the unweighted average across 
countries was about 6.8 per cent, suggesting that the effect of mining can be sizeable 
                                                 
1 We chose 2001 for two reasons. The first was availability of data on mining GDP, which we shall 
discuss later, and the second was that 2001 did not stand out for particularly high or low commodity 
prices. For five countries – Seychelles, Guyana, Libya, Haiti, and Angola – PWT does not provide 
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countries for which PWT had only 2000 data) of mining and quarrying (to which we shall simply refer 
as ‘mining’) in GDP from table 2.1 (Heston et al. 2006): value added by industries at current prices. 
For many countries, the table includes multiple data series over time. Each series represents a 
combination of various accounting categories for each country, such as currency, system of national 
accounts, and fiscal year type. Since using any single series would have resulted in omitting many 
countries, we took both total GDP and mining and quarrying GDP for each country from the highest 
numbered series that was available, since higher numbered series used more up-to-date methodology. 
For some countries 2001 data was unavailable, so we calculated shares based on the closest year to 




for many relatively small countries, even without taking into account its effects on 
industries that provide services to mining or use mined products as inputs. 
Table 1 shows the top thirty countries, ranked according to their mining GDP 
per capita measured using 2001 US dollars. I also ranked the countries using PPP 
(rather than US dollars) and using the share of mining in each country’s GDP. Among 









































Qatar 0.8 23.0 13.29 10.2 0.58 1 1 2 
United Arab Emirates 2.4 28.9 8.60 20.7 0.30 2 4 15 
Norway 4.5 37.5 7.63 34.5 0.20 3 5 20 
Kuwait 2.0 17.0 7.29 14.9 0.43 4 3 4 
Brunei Darussalam 0.3 12.2 4.86 1.7 0.40 5 2 7 
Oman 2.6 7.5 3.19 8.4 0.43 6 6 5 
Bahrain 0.6 12.4 3.07 2.0 0.25 7 8 18 
Saudi Arabia 22.8 8.1 2.70 61.5 0.34 8 7 11 
Libya 5.1 6.7 2.28 11.6 0.34 9 10 10 
Botswana 1.6 3.2 1.49 2.4 0.47 10 9 3 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.1 7.9 1.37 1.5 0.17 11 12 22 
Canada 31.0 22.8 1.22 38.0 0.05 12 15 49 
Gabon 1.3 3.7 1.14 1.4 0.31 13 11 13 
Australia 19.3 19.7 0.95 18.4 0.05 14 16 53 
Iran 66.8 5.6 0.86 57.5 0.15 15 21 23 
Venezuela 23.9 5.3 0.74 17.7 0.14 16 19 24 
Iraq 23.3 0.8 0.68 16.0 0.91 17 13 1 
Denmark 5.4 29.9 0.68 3.6 0.02 18 28 71 
Netherlands 16.0 25.1 0.63 10.0 0.02 19 24 65 
Algeria 31.7 1.7 0.60 19.2 0.35 20 14 9 
United Kingdom 58.9 24.4 0.57 33.3 0.02 21 31 69 
United States 287.0 35.1 0.41 118.7 0.01 22 36 88 
Malaysia 22.2 4.0 0.38 8.5 0.10 23 18 32 
Angola 10.1 0.9 0.30 3.0 0.33 24 27 12 
Chile 15.3 4.5 0.29 4.5 0.07 25 22 44 
Republic of the Congo  2.9 1.0 0.27 0.8 0.28 26 39 17 
Syria 16.7 1.2 0.25 4.1 0.20 27 37 21 
Namibia 1.9 1.7 0.23 0.4 0.13 28 25 26 
Azerbaijan 7.8 0.7 0.22 1.7 0.30 29 17 16 
South Africa 42.6 2.8 0.21 9.0 0.08 30 26 42 
Note. The share of mining in GDP calculated from United Nations (2009) and the other variables are taken from Penn 
World Tables (Heston et al. 2006).  PWT data are for 2001, except where this data was missing; the exceptions that 
appear in the table are Libya and the Republic of the Congo, for which we used 2000 data instead. The share of 
mining in GDP is computed using 2001, except where data was unavailable; the exceptions that appear in this table 
are Angola (for which the mining share was calculated using 1990 data) and Gabon and the Republic of the Congo 




these top thirty countries, oil-rich countries, including the Gulf states, are prominently 
represented. The concentration of revenues from resources in particular countries is an  
important, though not surprising, stylized fact. As I discuss later, this makes 
identification of the effect of natural resources more difficult. At the same time there 
are also some developed countries (such as Norway, Canada and Australia) that 
qualify as ‘resource-rich’ using the ranking by per-capita mining GDP.  
The correlation between the ranking of countries according to per capita 
mining GDP using dollars and using the PPP adjustment is 0.96, so adjusting for local 
prices appears to matter relatively little. The correlation between per capita mining 
GDP in dollars and the share of mining in GDP, however, is only about 0.71. While, 
as we shall see later, none of these measures is ideal, these correlations suggest  
that the choice of normalization (by population or GDP) may have important 
consequences for assessing the effects of resource-richness. 
The UN data allow us to look at natural resources’ share not only in GDP,  
but also in employment.3 Comparing the fifty-two countries which report both 
employment shares and GDP shares suggests that the average employment share  
of mining was about 0.6 per cent, compared with the average GDP share of mining  
of about 4.6 per cent. The ratio of GDP share to employment share of mining had  
an average of about 7.1, a median of about 1.9 and an interquartile range of 
approximately 1.1 to 4.8. This finding suggests that labour productivity in mining is 
much higher than in the rest of the economy; this probably reflects the mining sector’s 
intensive use of capital and technology. Moreover, the mining sector’s role in many 
national economies goes beyond its direct contribution to GDP. The share of exports 
and government revenues that is due to natural resources is often much higher than its 
share in GDP. Overall, hydrocarbons are clearly the most important source of 
revenues, although diamonds, bauxite, iron and gold are also important in some 
economies.4 It is worth noting that oil and other extractive industries often demand 
intermediate inputs and may thus also contribute to the development of other closely 
related industries. But this does not necessarily imply that these related industries  
will develop within the resource-rich countries themselves. 
                                                 
3 United Nation Statistics Division (2009), table 2.3: Output, gross value added, and fixed assets by 
industries at current prices. We use the item ‘Employment (average, in 1000 persons)’.  
4 For details on the contribution of various natural resources to government revenues and exports see 




An alternative to measuring countries’ resource output is to examine their 
proven reserves of natural resources, especially of oil. As mentioned above, oil  
plays a disproportionately important role among natural resources today and 
examining countries with large resources is instructive. The US Energy Information 
Administration (2009) lists the following countries as having the largest proven oil 
reserves (in billions of barrels, as of 2007): Saudi Arabia (262.3), Canada (179.2), 
Iran (136.3), Iraq (115.0), Kuwait (101.5), United Arab Emirates (97.8), Venezuela 
(80.0), Russia (60.0), Libya (41.5), Nigeria (36.2), Kazakhstan (30.0), and the United 
States (21.8). A comparison of the countries in this list with those that appear in Table 
1 reveals problems with assuming that the output measures of ‘resource richness’ are 
exogenous. For example, political considerations may prevent some countries (such  
as Iraq in 2001) from realizing their potential as major oil producers, while other 
producers (such as the United States and Norway) were still important oil producers  
in 2001 despite having exhausted much of their reserves. But this final example also 
demonstrates that not only oil output but also current reserves are highly endogenous 
to economic conditions. 
A more promising candidate for an exogenous measure of resource abundance 
is their natural endowment, which includes the quantity extracted over time and 
current reserves (for a within-country analysis of oil endowments in the US South see 
Michaels 2006). But for the time being, measuring endowments in a cross-country 
setting remains a challenge. When can this plausibly be achieved? One requisite is 
that each relevant country (and the oceans near it) has been surveyed carefully enough 
for us to be confident that a good approximation to the actual endowment is known. 
Another requisite is that incentives to disclose the correct estimates are in place,  
so that we can expect the reserve estimates to be authentic. 
The discussion above gives the reader some appreciation of the challenges  
to be met when assessing the causal impact of resource abundance on economic 
performance. The early empirical literature found evidence of a negative correlation 
between the share of natural resources in countries’ GDP or exports and their 
economic performance (see Auty 1993) and especially their growth over the past few 
decades (see, for example, the influential studies by Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001)). 
Although some of the more recent evidence is consistent with these findings (for  
a recent survey see Humphreys et al. 2007), other researchers criticise both the 




disagreements regarding the appropriate measurement of resource abundance, as 
discussed above. Stijns (2005) and Lederman and Maloney (2007) discuss alternative 
measures of resource abundance and conclude that the negative correlation between 
‘resource richness’ and economic growth is not robust. Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2007) use World Bank data on assessments of the value of the current stock of 
natural resources available in each country, and also conclude that resource 
abundance is not correlated with growth. 
A more nuanced view of the effect of natural resources is reflected in Mehlum 
et al. (2006), who argue that resource abundance has a positive effect in countries 
with strong institutions and a negative effect among countries with weak institutions. 
The idea that economies can benefit or lose depending how they utilize the resources 
and what they do with the rents is an important question which I shall revisit. 
But even if the precise mechanisms through which resource abundance affects 
economic outcomes are not fully understood, how is it possible that researchers 
cannot agree on the overall effect of resource abundance, and oil abundance in 
particular? Beyond the issues regarding the endogenous determination of known 
measures of resource abundance, two other issues stand out. First, there is a 
possibility of omitted variables bias: natural resources are not evenly spread across the 
globe, and their location might be spuriously correlated with other factors that affect 
economic outcomes. For example, the Middle East is oil-abundant, but its institutions 
and economic outcomes were very different from those of Europe even before oil was 
discovered (Pamuk 2006). It is quite possible that this region would have experienced 
different growth rates from other regions in the twentieth century even if no oil had 
been discovered there. Second, differences in measurement and the uneven quality  
of data on outcomes of interest across countries and over time make it even harder  
to identify oil’s causal effect. 
In order to make progress towards causal identification, some researchers have 
complemented the cross-country approach using case studies of resource-abundant 
countries or resource discoveries. For example, Botswana has been hailed as a 
successful resource-rich economy (Acemoglu et al. 2003) while Nigeria remains a 
poster child for failures (see Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003).5 But even this 
literature has found it difficult to construct good counterfactuals for countries: how 
                                                 




would the economies of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have evolved over time in the 
absence of their oil endowments? The limited number of countries we can analyse  
in this way restricts our ability to draw firm conclusions. But the emerging picture 
suggests considerable heterogeneity in the causal effect of natural resources, 
depending on how they are developed and used. 
In search of a better counterfactual for resource-rich economies, some  
recent studies use variation within countries instead of variation between countries.  
In the context of the Gulf states such studies are currently very difficult to undertake, 
since good data are hard to come by. And evidence from other parts of the world 
cautions us against drawing far-reaching conclusions from one setting to another. For 
example, I studied the long-term impact of oil abundance in Southern US counties and 
found mostly positive effects: higher per capita income, no adverse effect on income 
inequality, and increased population growth, reflecting the attractiveness of the oil-
rich areas relative to their vicinity (Michaels 2006). By contrast, in Caselli and 
Michaels (2009) we studied the impact of oil on Brazilian local governments. While 
we found no adverse effects on non-oil GDP, we found that the local governments 
spend oil revenues in ways that provided little benefits to the local population, and 
documented evidence that some of the oil money may have ‘gone missing’. The 
quality of institutions in most Gulf states appears to be somewhere between the 
United States and Brazil (Transparency International 2009), suggesting (very 
tentatively) that those countries may have benefited more than Brazil but less  
than the United States. But there are, of course, many caveats to this tentative 
conclusion. For example, some important mechanisms cannot readily be  
extrapolated from the local level to the national level. 
Clearly, more work is needed to determine the causal economic effect of 
natural resources in different countries. In particular, future research should strive  
for more careful identification in different settings. While obtaining data on some 
countries, especially in the Middle East, seems difficult (see for example Ross in 
Humphreys et al. 2007: 238–9), doing so could substantially enrich our understanding 
of the impact of natural resources. In particular, the different experiences of resource-
rich economies may reflect the varying importance of different channels through 




3. ECONOMIC CHANNELS AND ISSUES 
As we have seen, an assessment of the overall effect of resource abundance has so  
far proved elusive. But, at the same time, the literature has successfully shed light  
on some important economic issues pertaining to resource-rich economies. 
While some discussions of the effects of resource abundance treat income 
generated from natural resources as ‘free money’, it is worth noting that considerable 
investments need to be made to develop and sustain resource-intensive industries. 
This section explores some of the steps involved: finding suitable locations and 
estimating their economic potential, developing or adopting extraction technologies, 
and accumulating the appropriate physical and human capital. Once production takes 
place, economies need to cope with the effect of resource-intensive industries on local 
prices and price volatility, on the development of industries related to the resource-
intensive sector, and on income distribution. Further down the road lie issues of 
resource depletion, risks of a permanent decline in demand for a given resource, 
technological changes and the need to deal with potential hazards to health  
and to the environment.  
3.1. Discovery and development of resource-extraction industries 
This section begins by examining the requirements for utilizing natural resources. 
While the distribution of natural resource endowments across the globe is uneven,  
the relative economic attractiveness of different locations has varied considerably 
over time. In agricultural economies, fertile farmland was particularly important. 
Technological innovations, such as the steam engine, made locations abundant in coal 
particularly attractive. The automobile has made oil-rich locations important, while 
decreasing the importance of coal. Thus the definition of what constitutes a ‘resource-
rich’ location has changed considerably with technology and consumer demand. 
Once an area is considered to have economic potential, efforts to assess this 
potential may begin. The early search for natural resource endowments was typically 
unsystematic and was often conducted by entrepreneurial individuals. As economies 
developed, firms and governments took on greater roles. For example, the United 
States Geological Survey (USGS)6 was established in the late nineteenth century, but 
systematic mapping of natural resources in less developed countries occurred later. In 
the Middle East, for example, the slow mapping and development of oil deposits 





delayed the rise of Saudi Arabia and Iran as major producers of oil (US Department  
of Energy 2008). Even in recent years large deposits of oil have continued to be 
discovered, especially in developing countries. For both academic and policy-oriented 
researchers, getting good data on the location and quantity of natural resource 
endowments is vital for analysing their effects. 
Related to resource discovery is the issue of the development of oilfields, 
mines or other natural resource extraction sites. Whether development and extraction 
is to be performed by a large single player or through competition, the choice of the 
developer(s) – local or foreigners, firms or governments, could be important. Despite 
a long history of both foreign and domestic oil operations in developing countries,  
we still know relatively little about the merits of these different strategies. Knowing 
more could inform the ongoing choices of governments and citizens (for example, 
Iraq has recently auctioned the rights to extract some of its oilfields). 
For countries and local firms that choose to extract at least some of the mineral 
resources by themselves, raising capital is an important issue. The problem is not 
restricted to poor African countries – it might also apply to heavily indebted oil 
producers. And it can be important, given the capital requirements and technological 
intensity of the petroleum industry – especially when it comes to offshore oil 
operations. Understanding the role of financial institutions and institutional design in 
the development of natural resource industries is an interesting area for future work. 
The discussion of the cost of capital involved in developing resource-intensive 
industries gives rise to another related question – how to overcome the incentive to 
governments to expropriate firms that have invested, once the investment has taken 
place. Historical examples suggest that property rights protection may be important 
for the development of extractive industries. For example, development of extractive 
industries in the US South was slow relative to the North, despite the South’s 
abundance in oil (Wright 1986; Pratt 1980). Yet some recent research actually 
suggests that contract enforceability may be relatively unimportant in oil extraction, 
so that countries with poor institutions may specialize in oil or in other resource-
intensive industries because of comparative advantage (Nunn 2007). This difference 
in perspectives raises the need for more research on the importance of various 
institutional constraints for the development of resource-intensive industries. 
While much of what we know on the institutional constraints on the 




there are also some recent theoretical contributions. Stiglitz (in Humphreys et al. 
2007) discusses some of the issues involved in the design of contracts for oil 
exploration, to ensure that the state (and the public) does not give up rents from 
natural resources unnecessarily. Countries can design different auction schemes,  
such as royalty bidding (where firms bid on the percentage of production that  
the government is to receive) or bonus bidding, which can be used to increase 
competition or reduce information asymmetries. In designing the incentive schemes, 
ensuring genuine competition between firms can sometimes be a challenge, especially 
where a small number of firms dominate the industry (as in some Gulf states, for 
example). Governments may also choose to reduce royalties over time (to prevent 
companies from shutting down production when oilfield productivity falls) or offer 
checkerboard leases that reveal more information about oil endowments.  
Just as having a suitable institutional infrastructure may be important for 
developing a resource extraction industry, obtaining a suitable labour pool can also 
play a significant role. While some of the work in resource-intensive industries does 
not require very specialized skills, technological change in the industry means that 
skilled workers are often in high demand. Thus education and migration policies are 
potentially important in locations where skills are scarce, as I discuss below. But 
before discussing migration we should first concern ourselves with other issues  
that typically arise after production begins. 
3.2. The effects of developed resource-extraction industries  
The onset of substantial extraction of natural resources creates new challenges for 
resource-rich economies. One potential challenge may arise from a wealth effect 
(sometimes called a ‘spending effect’ in the Dutch disease literature). The mineral 
riches trigger a surge in demand for consumer goods. To satisfy the extra demand for 
non-tradables resources are reallocated from the (non-resource) tradable to the non-
tradable sector, while the extra demand for tradables is accommodated through 
increased imports (financed by the resource exports and, in some cases, external debt). 
This mechanism is sometimes fuelled by (and contributes itself to fuelling) an 
exchange-rate appreciation that further causes the non-resource export sector to 
shrink. A further effect of the wealth effect is that it potentially depresses overall 
labour supply, leading to a combination of higher wages and lower overall non-




of production factors across sectors due to direct demand by the resource-intensive 
sector or its employees, which may drain the non-resource part of the economy.7  
For these reasons, most Gulf states have developed economies with considerable 
dependence on oil. While this may be fine in the short and medium run, it might 
impose some longer-term costs.  
Matsuyama (1992) argues that in an open-economy setting a resource-rich 
economy may specialize in a resource-intensive sector and forego the development  
of other sectors where learning by doing is important.8 In this case, being resource-
abundant may actually be harmful in the long run, if demand for the resource-
intensive good grows more slowly than demand for other goods. While assessing the 
actual cost implied by this type of mechanism for oil rich economies in the Gulf states 
is a difficult challenge, it would be interesting to examine whether knowledge 
accumulation and technological change outside the oil sector has been slower. 
The model discussed above assumes that demand for natural resources may 
grow relatively slowly, but the empirical evidence is not as clear. Early work by 
Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) attributes much of the slow growth of some 
economies at the time to resource abundance and the relatively slow growth in the 
prices of resource abundant goods. But Cuddington et al. (in Lederman and Maloney 
2007) suggest that price changes might not have been the culprit. More work on 
understanding the demand for natural resources over long periods may shed more 
light on this important issue. 
In addition to the concern about the long-run trend in commodity prices, there 
has also been concern about the implications of price fluctuations.9 Commodity price 
volatility presents challenges not only for the resource extraction sector; the sectors 
that are most directly affected are closely related upstream and downstream industries 
(in the case of the oil industry, for example, these may include production and 
servicing of oil pipelines, petrochemical plants, etc.).10 Other affected sectors are non-
traded industries that provide intermediate inputs to the resource-extraction sector and 
its employees. Important examples include transportation, business services, 
                                                 
7 For various combinations of these Dutch disease mechanisms see Corden (1984), Corden and Neary 
(1982), Krugman (1987), Torvik (2001), Wijnbergen (1984) and Younger (1992).  
8 For a similar view see Lucas (1988). 
9 See, e.g., Humphreys et al. (2007), pp. 6–8. 
10 To address the problem of price volatility, some countries (e.g. Brazil before 1997 – see Caselli and 





construction, financial services and machinery manufacturers. Also affected are 
sectors that draw on the same pool of production factors when the supply of these 
factors is not perfectly elastic. Yet relatively little is known about the quantitative 
importance of these mechanisms in the context of the Gulf states. 
Increased volatility from a large resource-abundant sector can affect not only 
factor demand. The high level of uncertainty can also deter investments (Schott 1998). 
More studies of these effects of resource abundance also seem important for 
determining whether resource abundance crowds out the development of  
other sectors in the economy. 
The discussion of prices so far has assumed that each economy has relatively 
little market power. But this need not be the case if one country has a large market 
share worldwide or if several countries can form a cartel, such as the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In this context it seems useful to go 
beyond the classic rule derived by Hotelling (1931), which states that the growth in 
the price of non-augmentable and non-renewable resources should equal the discount 
rate. In particular, it seems useful to examine the importance of political and strategic 
considerations and of the effects of new discoveries (or expectations thereof). 
The ability of natural resource producers to organize across national borders 
also suggests that lobbying by firms within a country might also have important 
implications for resource-producing countries, potentially distorting other policies 
(e.g. trade). Similarly, workers in a resource industry might have a different 
propensity, to organize and create unions. Work by Holmes (2006) finds that  
in the United States unionization from mining establishments has spilled over  
to the rest of the (local) economy. While the conditions in the Gulf states are  
clearly different from those in the United States, the examples above suggest  
that understanding the institutional setting and market structure can be important  
for analysing economic performance.11 
3.3. The accumulation of labour, human capital, and physical capital 
Changes in institutions and commodity prices may over time affect the accumulation 
of production factors – labour, human capital, physical capital and technology. 
Initially, increased demand for local labour may be satisfied by locals who live  
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in the resource-abundant part of the economy. Eventually, higher wages may attract 
internal migration.12 But in some economies even the national labour pool is too small 
to satisfy the demand of the resource-rich industry, of closely related upstream and 
downstream industries, and of the government. In those cases foreign migration 
becomes an important aspect of economic development of resource-rich economies, 
such as those in the Gulf states. Immigrants present significant potential benefits  
to landowners (they tend to raise demand for housing), and they can also mitigate  
the price increases of some local services, partly offsetting some of the effects of 
Dutch disease discussed above. 
But the challenges brought about by migration are numerous. For example, 
when demand for property increases, renters may suffer. And while locals may benefit 
from certain aspects of the diversity brought about by the immigrants, migration also 
creates potential social and political tensions, as I discuss in the next section. 
In some countries, labour shortages in some sectors are not the main problem 
– rather, there are shortages of workers with particular skills. The resources at the 
disposal of governments and individuals provide an opportunity that some resource-
rich economies have used to bolster their educational systems. Yet Jones (2008) 
suggests that even the type of educational investments undertaken may be important – 
general skills may be harder to accumulate than one may think. It remains an 
important challenge for future work to assess empirically the implications of  
natural resource income on the extent and nature of educational investments  
in the Gulf states. 
In some developing countries the accumulation of local education and skills 
may be slow, so that migration of skilled workers from developed countries may 
become important. These foreigners may also affect the development of technology 
through universities and the private sector, and innovation. Of course, technology 
transfers to developing resource-rich economies may occur not only through 
migration. Yet we have relatively little empirical evidence about the importance  
of foreign direct investments or trade in facilitating such knowledge transfers. 
Moreover, there may be barriers to the adoption and diffusion of technologies in 
developed countries that affect the productivity of the resource-extractive sectors. And 
yet, over time, some resource-rich economies may themselves develop technologies to 
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overcome production problems (David and Wright 1997; Wright 1990) and eventually 
export their knowledge. Exporting oil-related services and technology may provide a 
route for economic diversification for the Gulf states. 
The potential for the accumulation of know-how and the production factors  
in economies or regions rich in natural resources also create a potential for 
agglomeration in those locations. This idea has been examined in the economic 
geography literature (see for example Krugman 1991b; Fujita et al. 1999). The  
‘home market’ effect, where transportation costs make locally produced goods  
more attractive, may contribute to such agglomerations.13  
Historical examples for agglomerations built around natural resources include 
the United States’ Manufacturing Belt (Krugman 1991a), which developed in a region 
rich in coal, industrial centres in the north of England, or the Ruhr region in Germany 
(Pounds 1952). Some oil rich Gulf states (such as Saudi Arabia and Dubai) have in 
recent years started to build ‘economic cities’ to try and capture some of the potential 
benefits of agglomeration. Unlike most of the historical examples mentioned above, 
however, the new economic cities rely on centralized planning more than on market 
forces. And given the structural shift of the world economy from manufacturing to 
services over the past decades, the economic cities’ core business is often farther 
removed from natural resources than that of their historical counterparts. 
One potential cause for the historical rise of agglomerations in resource-rich 
areas is the existence of economic (input–output) linkages to the resource extraction 
sector. While there are historical accounts of the evolution of industries related to 
resource-intensive industries,14 economic quantification of these mechanisms in 
specific contexts, such as the Gulf region, awaits future work. 
The discussion of the impact on economic development and growth of natural 
resources has so far mostly ignored distributional issues. But distributional issues can 
be important, especially in developing countries with high levels of inequality and 
poverty.15 Natural resource extraction firms are often quite large, possibly due to the 
need to pay large upfront costs and to limitations on borrowing by small firms. If 
ownership of resource extraction firms is concentrated, and if demand for local factors 
is low, then gains to the general population from resource extraction need not be 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Venables in Lederman and Maloney (2007), p. 267. 
14 See the analysis of the US South in Pratt (1980) and of Scandinavian countries in Blomstrom and 
Kokko in Lederman and Maloney (2007), p. 216). 




large. Unfortunately, it is difficult to examine oil’s effect on income distribution, 
because many resource-rich economies do not report data that allow a careful 
examination of inequality.16 Obtaining high-quality data to examine this issue remains 
an important challenge, especially for those studying Middle Eastern oil producers. 
3.4 Long-term costs and risks to resource-rich economies 
Along with the challenges discussed thus far, resource-rich economies may also at 
times contend with long-term risks to their economic success. There is a range of 
potential risks, but here I will focus on three in particular. The first is the risk of 
natural resource depletion, the second is that of a permanent drop in demand for a 
particular natural resource, and the third is that of technological change in the process 
of resource extraction. Of these three risks, depletion can often be anticipated (at least 
by some) and adjustments made accordingly. But while this may be true in theory, 
examining the ratio of output to proven reserves does not always provide us with as 
much insight as we may hope to get. For example, a recent estimate (ANP 2007) 
suggests that for the Middle East as a whole depletion might still be thirty years away, 
while for specific countries, such as Yemen and Oman, it may occur much sooner. For 
the world as a whole, ANP figures suggest that 2006 oil reserves would allow for 
about fifteen more years of production at the current rate, a figure which has remained 
almost unchanged since 1997. This apparent postponement of the depletion of the 
world’s oil supply reflects in part the discovery of new oilfields, improved extraction 
technologies and changing prices. But Luciani (2008) also points out strategic 
considerations (regarding internal and external parties) that affect the willingness of 
major producers such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to disclose their best estimates of 
their existing reserves. Such considerations cloud the picture regarding the onset of oil 
depletion, both in the world as a whole and in many specific countries. 
While oil depletion may be a relatively gradual phenomenon, in other settings 
‘depletion’ may occur fairly rapidly, as with some cases of fishery depletion, 
destruction of forests or the erosion of formerly rich soil. One historical example 
related to mining is that of Centralia, Pennsylvania, where slow-burning fires 
destroyed local anthracite coal mines (Quigly 2007). Another example is Kiribati, a 
Pacific island that lost its phosphate income around the time of its independence in 
1979, and is now one of the world’s poorest countries (US Department of State, 
                                                 




2009). Given the discussion above of the quality of existing data, oil depletion may 
also come as a surprise, at least to some individuals and firms. Their response may 
include changes in technology and industry structure, changes in private and public 
savings, and outward migration. These are important issues, and more research is 
needed on transition experiences of formerly specialized economies – both national 
and local – in order to shed light on the future transition of oil-rich economies in  
the Middle East when oil is depleted. 
Along with resource depletion, declines in demand may also pose a significant 
challenge, since economies typically have little control over them and are often less 
able to anticipate them. In the past, such episodes have not been very numerous, since 
rapid growth in world GDP has often offset declines in the demand share of particular 
natural resources.17 Historically, the world has witnessed declines in the importance  
of some sources of energy, such as peat (in the Middle Ages) and water power (in  
the nineteenth century, following the rise of steam power; see Rosenberg and 
Trajtenberg 2001). Perhaps more potentially relevant is the recent ‘rusting’ of  
the US manufacturing belt, which was built (at least partly) around coal, iron and 
rivers, and whose cold climate now makes it less attractive. This decline may serve  
as a warning for agglomerations built in the oil-abundant parts of the Middle East 
which also suffer from adverse weather conditions.  
Alongside changes in demand, changes in technology may also have large 
economic effects on resource extraction industries, even when demand does not 
decline sharply. For example, US total coal output fell by only 26 per cent from 1944 
to 1964. But this decline masks a large compositional change, as underground mining 
declined by 42 per cent, and surface mining (especially strip-mining) production 
actually increased. Partly as a result, the decline in hours worked in US mines was 
much more rapid: hours fell by 77 per cent over these twenty years. And while US 
coal output has since increased considerably, employment never fully recovered (in 
2007 output was higher than in any previous year while the number of hours worked 
in US coal mines was actually slightly lower than in 1964). The permanent loss of  
so many jobs has had a large impact on parts of the United States.18 One can only 
imagine how devastating the effect might have been were it not for the overall  
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growth of the US economy and the creation of many new jobs in other industries  
and areas. Careful analysis of such episodes may teach us how workers in resource-
rich economies could prepare themselves for possible technological changes  
in skill demand. 
The above discussion of the coal-mining industry brings to mind other 
concerns that have materialized over long periods in resource-rich economies. Among 
these are issues related to health risks and possible environmental damages, such as 
oil spillages. Mandatory purchase of insurance by producing (or shipping) firms 
against foreseen risks is one way to mitigate these concerns, but some risks may be 
too highly correlated to insure against. Moreover, extracting firms that caused such 
damages may be out of the country (or out of business) by the time the costs are 
realized. More research into designing institutional mechanisms to mitigate these 
problems can be important to resource-rich economies. 
Of even wider potential importance are broader environmental concerns 
related to resource-intensive industries. In particular, potential global externalities 
such as humanity’s contribution to global warming are of great importance (Stern 
2006). Resource-intensive industries may be involved through producing fuels or 
logging forests, both of which might contribute to the problem. But at least some of 
the proposed solutions, such as carbon capture and storage, may also involve know-
how developed in extractive industries (e.g. mining). Assessing the economic scale of 
the externalities involved and designing institutions and strategies to deal with these 
externalities are an important challenge for future work. 
4. THE ROLES OF GOVERNMENT IN RESOURCE-RICH ECONOMIES 
The previous discussion of possible market failures related to natural resource 
industries invariably brings up a discussion of the roles of government. Many 
governments have much at stake when it comes to revenues from natural resources. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2005), natural resource income 
accounted for more than 50 per cent of the fiscal revenues in at least nineteen 
countries.19 All but one of these countries was in the Middle East or in Africa,  
and in all except one country hydrocarbons were the most important natural  
resource. Comparing these figures with the figures on natural resources’ share  
                                                 





of GDP suggests that these resources figure more in government revenues than in the 
overall economy. As we shall see later, this reflects in part a tendency to tax natural 
resource income at fairly high rates. But before turning to the revenue side, I consider 
the roles played by governments in generating revenues from natural resources. 
The potential roles of governments on the productive side of a resource- 
rich economy are numerous. For example, governments may contribute to the 
development of natural resources by promotion of infrastructure development, 
reducing trade costs, providing a legal framework that allows producers to gain  
access to labour, physical capital, human capital and technological inputs, and setting 
labour practices. In empirical research it is often difficult to tease out the relative 
importance of these different interventions, which come ‘bundled’ differently  
in different countries. 
Even the question of how much a government should ideally invest is clearly a 
difficult one. Early work by Hartwick (1977) and Solow (1974) defines the amount of 
investment in produced capital (buildings, roads, knowledge stocks, etc.) that is 
needed to offset the declining stocks of non-renewable resources. The goal of these 
investments is to ensure that the standard of living does not fall as society moves into 
the indefinite future. But given the many routes of public intervention and many 
potential goals that governments may strive to achieve, it seems difficult to define 
what good investment policies should be, and how much intervention the government 
should make, given the private investments. Yet the previous discussion of oil 
producers’ potential vulnerability to future shocks to the oil sector suggests that 
governments in resource-rich economies need to be especially prudent, flexible, and 
forward-looking in considering their investment decisions. 
Recent work (Ploeg and Venables 2008) has focused more on assessing the 
optimal timing path for spending resource windfalls. Yet there is still much that we do 
not know about investment choices under uncertainty about future resource revenues. 
Alongside normative analysis of spending of natural resource revenues, more 
evidence is needed on how governments actually spend resource income and on 
whether their spending decisions are affected by the presence of oil revenues. For 
example, some research suggests that the presence of natural resources may distort 
investment decisions (Caselli 2007). More evidence is required on the use of natural 




example, while there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that oil money in the Gulf states 
has raised living standards, the magnitude of oil’s contribution is currently unknown. 
Another important question regarding the use of government revenues from 
natural resources is that of who gets to spend them: national governments or local 
governments? Countries differ in their allocation of revenues from taxes and royalties 
to the various government bodies. One important challenge is to assess whether 
payments to local governments are designed to compensate for production or 
transportation externalities incurred by the producing regions. Or, alternatively,  
are there political considerations (due to patronage, lobbying or electoral 
considerations) designed to increase co-operation from local politicians? For  
example, Brazilian municipalities that received large amounts of oil royalties and tax 
transfers because they happened to be located near offshore oilfields wasted a lot of 
this money (Caselli and Michaels 2009), and it is possible that some of the rents 
accrued to the local politicians. 
When it comes to procuring revenues, natural resources are also often more 
heavily taxed than other forms of economic activity. Higher taxation is sometimes 
justified by the low elasticity of natural resource revenues and the sense that property 
rights on the natural resource rents belong to the population at large; this makes 
economic sense, although the benefits of such high taxation should be carefully 
weighed against its costs (Boadway and Flatters 1993).  
One source of resource revenues for some governments is the auction of 
licences to extract natural resources from particular locations. In this context, it is 
important for the government to design auctions to extract rents from producing firms 
before information about the potential revenues is revealed as clearly as possible (see 
discussion by Stiglitz in Humphreys et al., 2007).  
Once a natural resource industry has developed, the government might be 
tempted to expropriate it, assuming that this will have relatively little impact on 
subsequent cash flows, at least in the short run. Expropriation may take on many 
forms, from increased taxation or fees, through the introduction of new, publicly 
funded competitors who may be favoured, to placing various arbitrary restrictions  
on resource-extraction firms that are earning ex-post rents, and finally to outright 
nationalization. The perceived threat of such actions may be an initial impediment  




The presence of incentives for governments to expropriate or misallocate 
natural resource income suggests that the challenges for governments are larger in 
countries with weak institutions.20 Other recent work also concludes that natural 
resources may impose costs related to government behaviour, especially in developing 
countries. For example, abundant natural resources may increase rent seeking (Tornell 
and Lane 1999; Halvor et al. 2006a, 2006b), patronage and waste (Robinson et al. 
2002), or shortened planning horizons due to increased political challenges to power 
(Caselli 2007). But convincing evidence of a ‘corrupting’ effect of natural resource 
abundance is difficult to come by. One paper that sheds some light on this issue is the 
above-mentioned study of Brazilian municipalities (Caselli and Michaels 2009), 
which uncovers evidence that large oil revenues increase the odds of news and police 
investigations of alleged criminal activities involving mayors.21 This evidence 
suggests that oil money might be more easily ‘stealable’ than other sources, perhaps 
due to opacity. To mitigate this problem, monitoring of actual oil money disbursement 
(and not just monitoring of balance sheet records), coupled with improved 
accountability, may increase the benefits to the population of oil revenues  
in many resource-rich countries. 
Ineffective use of public funds derived from natural resource income is not 
restricted to corruption and waste. Another potentially severe problem of government 
budgets that are based in large part on natural resource income is related to 
commodity price volatility. The resulting volatility in a government’s income stream 
makes careful planning over the long term difficult. Moreover, rapid and unexpected 
declines in natural resource revenues may leave governments facing uncompleted 
projects and investments that have unexpectedly become unfeasible. For example, 
recent declines in oil prices have forced several oil-rich Middle-Eastern governments 
to rewrite their budgets. Declines in commodity prices also pose a threat of debt 
overhang that can cripple resource-rich economies (see Manzano and Rigobón  
on Latin America in Humphreys et al. 2007). 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) offer a possible way to reduce governments’ 
vulnerability to fiscal volatility that arises from commodity price shocks. If managed 
correctly, sovereign wealth funds allow governments to smooth the unpredictable 
stream of revenues from natural resources. These funds also mitigate the above-
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mentioned risk of strong inflationary pressures during demand booms. But sovereign 
wealth funds also pose new challenges. For example, can they effectively prevent the 
use of the funds to promote political goals? Or where should the money be invested, 
when information on overseas investments is harder to come by? Or can resource 
booms contribute to asset price bubbles (and busts)? These and other problems related 
to SWFs may be especially severe in developing countries, due to poor monitoring 
and transparency. Recent efforts to improve governance of SWFs (e.g. the Santiago 
Principles of October 2008) are perhaps somewhat counterbalanced by reports that 
resources from some Gulf states’ SWFs (e.g. Kuwait Investment Authority) have  
been diverted to local use during the recent financial crisis.22 The emergence of  
SWFs is a relatively recent phenomenon, so that their usefulness as a government  
tool has not yet been extensively researched. 
Political interactions with the resource-intensive sector are not restricted to 
issues of the use of funds by SWFs. Some lobbying on the part of private firms 
interested in developing the resource-intensive sector seems almost inevitable. Close 
relations between firms and governments, especially when firms are large and well 
established and information is opaque, can aggravate problems of embezzlement and 
diversion of rents; beyond the direct losses to the public, the adverse effects on the 
overall quality and function of politicians and government employees are potentially a 
serious threat on which we still have relatively little empirical evidence.23 At the same 
time, exchanges between private and public players can also bring about useful 
investments in public goods, such as mapping out the extent of the natural  
resources and laying out the institutional and physical infrastructure required for the 
development of the extractive industries. It appears that there may be a gap between 
the social benefits from such lobbying (which may be high when the resource-
intensive sector is underdeveloped) and the private incentives and ability to  
undertake such lobbying (when the resource intensive industry is already strong  
and well developed). And empirical evidence on such lobbying may be harder to 
come by where the problems are particularly severe. 
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Alongside lobbying, another challenge for governments in some resource-rich 
economies is a legacy of inequality. Inequality may be related not only to current 
technology and institutions (as discussed in the previous section). There may also be, 
at least in part, a legacy from past episodes of resource extraction or early economic 
development. Inequality may, in turn, have affected institutional structures or 
interacted with them. Important examples of such institutions include slavery, poor 
education systems, or weak law enforcement (see, e.g., Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; 
Naritomi et al. 2007; and Bobonis 2008). Understanding the legacy of natural 
resources and its impact on current government performance in different countries 
remains an important challenge for future research.  
The research on the legacy of resource-abundant economies is also related to 
the broader literature on the long-term effects of colonialism (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 
2002). While intervention by foreign powers is often (but not always) subtler today 
than it has been in the past, its effects can nonetheless be important. Sadly, conflicts 
and even wars in areas of strategic natural resources (especially in the Middle East 
and in Africa) have continued to erupt even in recent years.24 Evidence on the causal 
effect of natural resources on these conflicts remains difficult to pin down, and more 
research on this important topic seems warranted. 
Just like their foreign policies, the domestic politics of resource-rich 
economies can be quite complex, even in times of peace. Migration is an issue of 
particular interest, especially in the Middle East. As discussed above, migration 
includes highly skilled and specialized workers, who are sometimes Westerners 
working in developing countries. While numerically small, this group may be 
politically and economically important and may give rise to considerable political 
opposition, especially when differences in ideology, religion and customs are 
substantial. These and other problems might also be associated with immigrants from 
less developed countries, who are often more numerous. Governments face serious 
challenges in ensuring the rights of these workers and their living conditions. 
Moreover, when this group becomes large and remains in the country over prolonged 
periods of time, some first- (or second-, or third-) generation migrants may seek rights 
of political representation. The resulting stand-off may make it harder to provide 
public goods (see, e.g., Alesina et al. 1999) or to develop democratic political 
                                                 




institutions, which may have important consequences for growth and equity. This 
issue is especially important in many of the smaller Gulf states. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR OIL-RICH MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES 
Resource-rich economies face a multitude of challenges in leveraging these resources 
to improve the lives of their residents today and in the future. Many of the challenges 
outlined in this paper pertain to oil-rich countries in the Middle East and in the Persian 
Gulf, and I conclude by highlighting the following six considerations.  
First, Dutch disease and the industry structure to which it has given rise 
(where few tradable goods other than oil are produced) may not be much of a problem 
today, but it poses a challenge for structural change in the event of oil depletion or 
technology-driven change in global demand for oil. The challenge here is to combine 
flexibility in developing new industries if and when the need arises, while ensuring 
sufficient (and credible) welfare nets for the population.  
Second, governments and firms in the Middle East need better-informed 
strategies for coping with oil price volatility. Formulating such strategies requires 
carefully thought-out priorities and flexibility in meeting and evaluating them, in the 
light of the difficulty in relying on SWFs to smooth income flows. 
Third, while the economic benefits of allowing many immigrants into the Gulf 
Region are substantial, dealing with the social and political challenges posed by this 
massive immigration raises important issues, especially in downturns and in the light 
of institutional changes towards more public involvement in decision making. 
Fourth, there are concerns that oil revenues and reserves are more easily kept 
secret than other sources of revenue, and that the resulting opacity causes potentially 
valuable resources (not only due to oil) to be wasted or misused. Institutions should be 
better designed to address these concerns if oil money is to be used appropriately to 
improve people’s lives. 
Fifth, Middle Eastern governments should consider the potential impact of oil 
beyond their national borders. The strategic importance of oil appears to have fuelled 
conflicts and wars in the past, and more systematic evidence on the mechanisms that 
mitigate or aggravate this problem is needed if we are to avoid them in the future. 
Finally, the possibility that the use of fossil fuels might be contributing to 




from oil. Such a change may feed back into most of the challenges mentioned above 
and further aggravate them. 
For researchers who wish to examine these and other issues discussed in this 
paper, many challenges also remain. In particular, many theoretical mechanisms have 
been put forth for explaining the effect of natural resources on economic performance 
and development. However, in many cases empirical evidence still lags behind the 
theory. Getting better data and cleaner identification of various channels of causation 
in different settings could make a real contribution towards formulating good policies 
and overcoming the development challenges faced by resource-rich economies. 
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